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Ready to Re-Launch: Fixing the Pitch for the
Social Enterprise
SHELLEY A. D. SANDOVAL*
Corporate misfeasance places headlines of economic fraud and shareholder suits above the fold in today’s changing marketplace. Corporate re8
sponse directly appealing to the socially charged agenda of the incoming
Millennial generation continues to fall short of marketplace expectations
among buyers focused on genuine action and real-time transparency. Individual states have passed legislation to support development of social value
on the corporate agenda using tax credits, most have been met with variable
results. The international playing field enjoys aggressively growing support
in recognition of social value creation and capture. The United States drags
its heels bound by the stiff structures of corporate law, taxation, and questions left unexamined due to a muddled landscape of various social issues,
terms and agendas.
This Comment uses Illinois’s Benefit Corporation Act and its efficacy to
date as a “stuck in the middle” scapegoat against the backdrop of America’s
evolving marketplace. Factors mitigating an evolving ecosystem reallocate
the weight given to traditional supply and demand factors. Rising in power
among management teams and representing growing market value, millennial buyers choose to place emphasis on new factors placing social and monetary objectives on opposite sides of the scales that balance America’s cor8
porate industry.
Culminating in a comprehensive sweep of novel and timeless issues facing social value enterprises, such as enforcement and measurement, this
Comment enlivens discussion of collaboration, conscience, and evolution of
law as diversity in thinking, individual value and social factors are in vogue
among legislating states, enforcing courts and agency authorities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION 6 ADDRESSING U.S. ECONOMIC EXPEDIENCY IN
THE MIDST OF PALPABLE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Capitis aestimatio or 5valuing of a head>- dramatiBes the monetary
value of an individual within their community as an economic term of human
capital.1 Although the noble roots of an individual’s values remain unchanged> economic forces in today’s society are pushing !merica’s legal
framework to maximize the social value of human capital captured within the
social enterprise. Flexible purpose corporations, low profit limited liability
corporations (L3C), and benefit corporations (B Corp) are all legally recognized United States corporate forms falling under the 5social enterprise- umbrella, heretofore targeting a niche green activist consumer segment. 5The
explanation behind the LLC’s birth boils down to innovative professionals
creating solutions when the current legal system fails to meet client needs.-2
The social enterprise, broadly defined as seeking to maximize both profit and
social value, is far from novel.3 Momentum within an expanding consumer
1. Historic Latin term used when assessing a fine paid for someone’s murder. Capitis aestimatio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1459, 1463 (1998).
3. Kyle Westaway, Profit + Purpose, STAN. UNIV. LECTURE SERIES (Apr. 9, 2012)
(downloaded using iTunesU). Many socially conscious private corporate forms exist, but none
explicitly differentiate objectively good companies from companies that operate with a visage
of goodwill within an objective framework of checks and balances set forth in the structure of
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base that values long-term reward over short-term success demands attention
from corporate officers and legislators, mirroring that of the evolving global
panacea focused on capturing social value while maximizing profit.4
Although for-profit companies have a unilateral fiduciary duty legally
binding management to maximize shareholder value,5 case law 5and the de<
cisions offer little in the way of predictability or rational explanation of why
enumerated factors should be decisive.-6 Technically, a corporation pursuing
objectives that do not maximize shareholder value operates with increased
liability of a shareholder derivative suit;7 realistically courts assess offering
management broad freedoms only requiring a rational relation between an
officer’s decision and its purpose to maximize shareholder value.8 Frequent
headlines reporting corporate fallout due to mismanaged decisions demonstrate the reality of confusion created by the broad freedom afforded to corporate officers who are required only to rationally relate the purpose of their
decision-making. There are several examples, such as the large-scale
Volkswagen car recall following the discovery of false emissions tests.9 Or
Vantiv Inc., a service fee processing corporation for online sport betting,
commonly known as DraftKings, which fell under investigation for illegal
the B Corp. For example, the Flexible Purpose Corporate form allows for value creation defined within a special purpose, however success is measured subjectively; L3Cs allow investment of private equity and debt towards program related investments (PRI) but are only available for corporations in a low profit threshold. See generally KYLE WESTAWAY, PROFIT &
PURPOSE: HOW SOCIAL INNOVATION IS TRANSFORMING BUSINESS FOR GOOD (2014) [hereinafter Profit & Purpose].
4. E.g., Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/11/the-for-benefit-enterprise (noting the current corporate system’s effect
on the social entrepreneur is 5shoehorning their vision into one structure or the other and ac<
cepting burdensome trade-offs in the process-@.
5. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10(b)(3) (Lexis through P.A. 99-928, except for
portions of P.A. 99-906, and 99-012> 2012 Reg. .ess.@ Adirectors have a 5duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its shareholders- only@.
6. BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW § 5-4, at 182 (2d ed. 2000) (addressing
the state of U.S. corporate law in holding shareholders and/or directors liable for actions).
7. Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation
Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 401 (2014).
8. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986), with In re Goldman .achs Grp.> :nc. .’holder Litig.> 7o. 3213-VCG, 2011
WL 4826104, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (dismissing a complaint alleging directors violated their fiduciary duties by always encouraging excessive risk-taking). See also Gordon v.
Bindra, No. 2:146cv6010586ODW (ASx), 2014 WL 2533798, at *11-12 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(officers who also serve as directors do not lack independence as a matter of law).
9. E.g., Mike Spector, VW Dealers Suffer as Diesel-Car Sales Stall, WALL ST.
JOURNAL (last updated Dec. 18, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/vw-dealers-suffer-as-diesel-car-sales-stall-1430473102 A+olkswagen’s management decisions to manipulate
emissions tests for 500,000 vehicles in violation of U.S. emissions standards resulted in multibillion-euro costs to remedy the issue and repair the damage to its reputation, regulatory penalties, and litigation).
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gambling allegations, and where corporate counsel reported being unsure of
the management’s duties and rights.10
Litigation surrounding social enterprises is no exception to the vividly
muddied scene of today’s corporate 4urisprudence. The social enterprise represents an opportunity to evolve stale corporate jurisprudence while continuing maximization of shareholder value propelled by a market that understands the value of human capital as extending beyond short-term rewards to
capturing long-term creation of social value in its corporate objectives.11 The
social enterprise corporation answers today’s marketplace demand, but
within the existing corporate structures will likely fail. Burt’s Bees> Etsy>
IBM, Method, and Nike are all household names using their trade to serve a
purpose;12 all of which are not legally registered social enterprises, but
proudly operate using strategic auspices of social value creation.13 Branding
is necessary to enable profitability within corporate social value concepts.14
Without a legal regulatory structure or branding recognition, social enterprises will remain stuck in the muddy wake of too-big-to-fail corporations
independently operating within their own concepts of social purpose. Internationally, supply and demand for social value is not only being articulated
among the G8; various forms of social enterprise corporations are currently
adopted in fifty countries.15 The U.S. legal bodies and consumer markets
must respond to our strained corporate system to stop leaving modern-day

10. EXHIBIT B, LETTER FROM VANTIV, N.Y. CTY, INDEX NO. 654456/2015 (Nov. 12
2015),
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=FloOpRB/89r9gq4pdJSXoA==&system=prod.
11. See generally STEPHEN DAVIS, JON LUKOMNIK & DAVID PITT-WATSON, THE NEW
CAPITALISTS: HOW CITIZEN INVESTORS ARE RESHAPING THE CORPORATE AGENDA (2006).
12. Burt’s Bees develops a line of natural body care products$ Etsy connects local
handmade goods to consumers; IBM launched a commercial research lab in Africa to create
commercially viable products to address !frica’s ongoing challenges$ Method produces nat<
ural cleaning products; Nike focuses on people, planet, and impact in their design process. See
generally PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at xxiv (2014).
13. Burt’s Bees boasts triple bottom line purpose Apeople> profit> planet@ ob4ectives
through its 5The Greater Good- branding. :BM identifies their responsibility and role in ap<
plying technology to societal problems, empowering employees, and corporate citizenship;
Nike focuses on sustainable innovation providing comprehensive progress reports and partnerships for the Global Reporting Initiative and the United Nations Global Compact. BURT’S
BEES, It’s 2ot 3ust a Business Model it’s 'ur Life’s Work, https://www.burtsbees.com/content/our-purpose/our-purpose-1asset.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2016); IBM, Corporate Responsibility at IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/?lnk=fab (last visited Jan. 25,
2016); NIKE INC., Corporate Responsibility Reporting, http://about.nike.com/pages/resourcesfaq (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
14. McKenzie Holden Granum, With the Emergence of Public Benefit Corporations,
Directors of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, but Welcome the
Opportunity to Invest in Social Enterprise, 38 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 765, 781 (2015).
15. B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
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human capital, proven to maximize both fiscal and social value, sitting on the
table.

II.

TODAY’S SOCIAL ENTERPRISE TREND 6 THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to
adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.16
-James Madison, Federalist No.10, November 23, 1787
The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby17 decision was the first time corporate purpose was directly addressed by the Supreme Court.18 Judicially endorsing the
corporation as a function of shareholder wealth maximization as opposed to
corporate personhood,19 Hobby Lobby recogniBed that 5it is not at all uncom<
mon- for a corporation 5to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.-20 Evidenced by the Hobby Lobby Supreme Court grant of certiorari,
the U.S. economic climate is ripe for the unfolding pedagogy surrounding the
concept of the social enterprise.
Traditional notions of the corporation are shifting as focus on value attributed to stakeholders (versus shareholders) continues to be exalted in popular and scholarly discourse.21 Shareholder primacy22 is now a shadow cast
behind the emergence of stakeholder theory, focusing on the interests of
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766-76 (2014).
18. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby
Lobby, 70 BUS. L. 1 (2015).
19. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM.
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015).
[S]hareholders of a closely held corporation can alter the default rules of
corporate law, including the issue of corporate purpose. . . . [T]he doctrine of
waste should allow any shareholder who disagreed to challenge corporate conduct
that was pursued for purely religious or social responsibility purposes without any
claimed shareholder wealth benefit . . . .
Id. (explaining the result of an action by a shareholder for non-wealth maximization purposes
effectively enables a shareholder to claim a right by using the corporation to achieve a desired
social purpose).
20. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
21. Sharfman, supra note 7, 394.
22. Shareholder primacy embodies the theory that corporations shall make shareholder interests primarily important before other stakeholders. Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 693-694, 693 n. 22 (2015).
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stakeholder groups such as employees, customers, creditors, and society in
its corporate management and legal philosophy.23
The existing narrative of U.S. corporate law places Delaware at the forefront of best practices and California the frontrunner for ingenuity. :llinois’s
reputation for industrial strength within a temperamental economy, adoption
of B Corp legislation in 2013 received with hostile community-wide acceptance, makes Illinois an ideal incubator to realistically assess a social enterprise’s market-making potential.24
A.

LEGISLATING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION

The Benefit Corporation Act25 (The BCA) made Illinois one of thirtyone states to legaliBe a private corporation’s interest in using the business to
maximize both profit and social value.26 The BC!’s language is derived from
the legal authority for corporate formation, Business Corporation Act of
1983.27 The BCA mirrors model legislation adopted by most states proffered
by B Lab, a nonprofit organization leading lobbying and grassroots activism.28 The BCA distinguishes the B Corp as a specialized corporate form by
incorporation of terms to establish no duty exists to make the interests of any
shareholder or stakeholder priority over the interests of another.29
Under current law,30 corporations must maximize profits for the shareholders and cannot weigh other concerns. 5The proposed bill expands corporate purpose for these corporations to allow owners to consider society and
environment, in addition to profit.-31 Senator Frerichs continued to express
23. Id.
24. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 (Lexis through P.A. 99-928, except for portions
of P.A. 99-906, and 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.) (HB1261 makes a technical change to The Benefit Corporation Act).
25. Id.
26. State by State Status of Legislation, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
27. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1.01 (Lexis through P.A. 99-928, except for portions of P.A. 99-906, and 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
28. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation with Explanatory Comments, B LAB (Jan.
13, 2016), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_2016.pdf [hereinafter Model Benefit Corporation].
29. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE
97th ILL. GEN. ASSEMB., S. 97-2897 at 1507 (2013), ftp://12.43.67.2/Digest/97thFinalDigest.pdf.
30. The Business Corporation Act of 1983 designates all businesses recognized in
:llinois as purposed 5for the . . . buying> selling> or otherwise dealing in notes . . . .- 103 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.05 (Lexis through P.A. 99-935, except for portions of P.A. 99-912 &
99-933 of the 2016 Reg. Leg. Sess.).
31. Senate Transcript of Record, 97th Ill. Gen. Assemb., SB2897, at 116-17 (March
28, 2012), http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/09700098.pdf (statement by Senator Frerichs) (introducing the BCA, clarifying the enhanced transparency and accountability,
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concern about shareholder lawsuits resulting from a corporate officer’s deci<
sion to pursue a project for their local community as opening itself up to the
potential liability of shareholder derivative suits.32
Building on Senator Frerichs’s remarks, the parlance and perspectives
captured in the Illinois House and Senate debates articulate the legislative
purpose of the BCA to create a legal duty for officers to weigh equally corporate decisions to maximize both shareholder and social value creation.33
Shareholder derivative suits are often cited as a reason why social enterprises
should be better legislated; in practice these allegations function as a red herring.34 Case law demonstrates causation in connection with the breach of fiduciary duty as equally difficult to allege and reason on both sides of the
bench, even in the most clear cut cases.35 Often employing the business judgment rule,36 absent evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality or gross overreaching, courts are not at liberty to interfere with the managerial decision-making
of corporate officers.37
Notable in recently evolving dicta is an expanding scope of corporate
rights while providing a paucity of opinion responding to these evolving corporate constitutional issues.38 The BCA requires B Corp directors and officers only to consider the impact of the company’s actions on both private and
public stakeholders.39 Because of its recent adoption, case law to carve out
rights and duties of those executing the business of a B Corp does not exist.
Distinctions between objective and subjective elements related to the defining difference of all forms of social enterprise (added purpose) leave all parties questioning the practical legal effect.
potential to attract business with social responsibility interests, voluntary incorporation and no
changes to Illinois corporate taxation).
32. Id.
33. Senate Transcript of Record, 97th Ill. Gen. Assemb., SB2897 (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans97/09700098.pdf; House Transcript of Record,
97th Ill. Gen. Assemb., SB2897, at 17-18 (May 10, 2012), http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans97/09700134.pdf (statements by Senator Feignholtz, and Senator Reboletti).
34. Id.
35. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-79 (1977) (fairness is not a
factor courts assess> because this would open the ‘floodgates of litigation’@$ see generally Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (example of a court not fully understanding the
corporate securities law in relation to use of a statutory prospectus).
36. Granum, supra note 14, at 772.
37. An example of extreme overreaching occurs when a director did not exercise due
care in being sufficiently informed of material facts necessary to carry out duties when making
an independent business decision. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1713-31 (2015);
see supra note 8.
38. See supra notes 8, 37.
39. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.01 (Lexis through P.A. 99-928, except for portions of P.A. 99-906, and 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.10 (Lexis
through P.A. 99-928, except for portions of P.A. 99-906, and 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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For example, a comparison can be drawn by equating the TOMS® corporate social value objective, 5for every pair : sell> :’m going to give a pair
of new shoes to a child in need,-40 to the Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg
opinions conveyed within a corporate prospectus stating investors will receive 5high value for their Fminority shareholderE shares.-41 Both statements
can be evaluated using an evidentiary standard (shoes sold match those donated; stock benefits to minority holders comparable to those of majority
holders) to objectively measure the validity of the underlying opinion.42
The subjective nature of social value creation raises an issue of credibility and legal standing. When can a shareholder bring a claim against
TOMS® for not creating enough social value in the selection of 'ualified ‘in
need’ children" :n Virginia Bankshares> the court found a corporation’s opin<
ion of what constitutes 5high and fair- value of their stock only rises to the
legally actionable material misstatement of fact, if objective evidence proves
the underlying opinion supporting the statement is false.43 One would be hard
pressed to find the suitable evidence that the courts require such as internal
board documents, meeting minutes or emails.44
5: think we should hold back,- Leader Hurkin shared to the Illinois Senate during floor debates, questioning the impact of B Corp objective and subjective elements as applied to shareholders, officers and the general public.45
Directly responding to information presented that related to the third party
review standard for B Corp social value creation, Leader Durkin embodies
traditional corporate ideology in stating:
For an investor, this is a terrible idea, . . . the structure creates a lack of accountability he adds. So, if
the management of a benefit corporation makes a
bad decision> there’s very little you can do about it
as a shareholder. Now, you look at the Bill, it states
that exoneration for personal liability an officer is

40. T/M.# corporate mission states: 5FiEt’s about a promise—a better tomorrow.BLAKE MYCOSKIE, START SOMETHING THAT MATTERS 6 (2011).
41. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991) (shareholder
stocks can be assessed using recognized methods of valuation: the bank's assets, actual and
potential levels of operation).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326-28 (2007)
(holding evidence that is incorporated by reference and taken collectively must plead facts
rendering an inference of scienter must be at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference
to protect against frivolous unsound claims).
45. House Transcript of Record, 97th Ill. Gen. Assemb., SB2897, at 25 (May 10,
2012), http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans97/09700134.pdf.
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not personally liable for monetary damages for action taken as an officer if the officer performed the
duties of the position in compliance with this Section or failure of the benefit corporation to pursue
or create general public benefit or specific public
benefit. For the past 150 years jurisprudence in this
country has allowed for the theory called where you
can hold officers and directors personally liable by
piercing the corporate veil which is when they have
acted outside the scope of their corporation and
against the best interest of the investors. We’re go<
ing to reverse that in Illinois with this Bill.46
The questions and concerns raised in Leader Hurkin’s remarks empha<
size the common misunderstanding of the liabilities and duties imposed under The BCA as different from those under the traditional Business Corporation Act of 1983.47 The only distinction between a B Corp and any other corporate form is the added ability to maximize social value using the corporation’s resources> which is proven to be legally insignificant because it is not
recognized as a valid claim for standing on a state or federal basis.48
Leader Durkin mentions a conversation with the Illinois State Bar Association and their comment regarding its Corporate Law Hepartment’s at<
torneys who 5don’t understand the nature of it and why we need it- which
unfortunately does paint a realistic picture of the B Corp’s position in local
communities.49 Organizations like Impact Engine, a Chicago-based accelerator program for social enterprises, communicated in Leader Hurkin’s re<
marks. Quoting Tasha Seitz, Impact Engine Chief Investment Officer, explaining why they encourage their member companies to incorporate as C
corporations instead of B Corps, because 5that’s what investors are comfort<
able with. It’s hard for startups to pry checks from investors’ hands in the

46. Id. at 24.
47. Compare 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.05 (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except
for portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.05 (Lexis
through P.A. 99-932, except for portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
48. Compare 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.05 (LexisNexis 2013), with 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.05 (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for portions of P.A. 99-912,
2016 Reg. Sess.).
49. House Transcript of Record, 97th Ill. Gen. Assemb., SB2897, at 25 (May 10,
2012), http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans97/09700134.pdf (remarks of Leader
Durkin).
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first place, and the unfamiliar designation 5is just one more thing you have
to explain.-50
B.

STUCK IN THE MIDDLE - ILLINOIS BENEFIT CORPORATIONS

As defined in The BCA, social value creation of general and specific
purpose is difficult to define regardless of methodology or opinion.51 Patagonia, for example, has made significant investments toward research and development of sustainable clothing materials.52 Determining whether Patagonia’s officers properly allocated resources to meet their duty to the community who reaps the benefits of their sustainable clothing material research,
versus allocated resources towards advertising spend or operational decisions
to meet their duty to maximize shareholder value, clearly demonstrates there
are no bright lines to draw.53
For an Illinois company to become a B Corp it must satisfy the three
main pillars serving as the locus of the social enterprise’s corporate distinc<
tion: purpose, accountability, transparency.54 The BCA attempts to further
define ‘corporate purpose’ as either general or specific types of social value

50. Steve Hendershot, Is Being a $4ood’ Business 4ood for Business!, CRAINS CHI.
BUS.
(Oct.
25,
2014),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20141025/ISSUE02/310259996/is-being-a-good-business-good-for-business
(quoting
7ancy Goldstein> founder of Compass *> an :llinois registered B Corp: 5People follow the
money. . .FtEhe way the B Corp community will thrive is if we’re all wildly successful.-@.
51. Pfeiffer v. Begley, 2015 IL App (2d) 140271, 27 N.E.3d 670, 676 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015). The elasticity of the legal definition of corporate purpose as delineated in Pfeiffer v.
Begley is:
While the benefit achieved may have an indirect economic effect on the corporation, in the sense that the interests of the
plaintiff class reflect a value not theretofore apparent, the benefit need not be measurable in economic terms. Changes in corporate policy or, as here, a heightened level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may justify
an award of counsel fees.
Id. (citing Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164665 (Del. 1989). See generally /linga Ta’eed et. al.> Social Value in Public Procurement: 2014 Pathfinder Project for
Public, Private, Third and Community Sectors, CTR. FOR CITIZENSHIP ENTER. & GOVERNANCE
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/6281932/6282225/SUMMARY+Social+Value+in+Public+Procurement+(2+Oct+201
4).pdf/26f936ef-995a-40bc-9831-0de897c5e569.
52. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 487-88 (2013).
53. Id.
54. Model Benefit Corporation, supra note 28.
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creation.55 The BCA attempts to define general public benefit> as a 5material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole . . . from
the business and operations of a benefit corporation>-56 and distinguishes specific public benefit as:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services;
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the
ordinary course of business;
(3) preserving the environment;
(4) improving human health;
(5) promoting the arts, sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; or
(7) the accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or the environment.57
Until the general and specific public benefit captured in the BCA can be
legally defined using legally recognized measureable terms, all parties to
whom B Corps exist to serve are defenseless against non-meritorious claims
of advancing social value.58 Corporations, like Patagonia, that have the ability to operate within social value concepts report strong internal ethical values, placing at the top of 5ortune’s best places to work list and increased
sales.59 Warby Parker attributes $100 million in venture capital gains as a
result of its social value creation approach.60 The potential is obvious yet

55. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, A GUIDE FOR ORGANIZING DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS
3-4
(2016),
www.cyberdriveillinois.com/publications/pdf_publications/c179.pdf.
56. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10 (1)-(7) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except
for portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Kevin Ercoline, Beyond Puffery: Providing Shareholder Assurance of Societal
Good Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 169, 170-72 (2014);
see generally PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3.
60. Ercoline, supra note 59; PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3.
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translating these material benefits to gain the investor buy-in necessary to be
successful will remain a primary culprit of B Corp success.61
The Benefit Report is the vehicle for B Corp communication and transparency. It is by law made publicly available on the B Corp’s website and
distributed to shareholders annually.62 The reporting requires comprehensive
details of the company’s progress towards meeting its indicated general and
specific public benefit objectives.63 While other states with similar B Corp
statutes require the Benefit Report to be filed with the state,64 Illinois removed this requirement in a subsequent amendment to The BCA.65 Not requiring B Corps to submit Benefit Reports to the state for public record exemplifies :llinois’s negligible commitment to the quality and accuracy of the
information contained in these reports.66 :n :llinois> the only way a B Corp’s
annual reports are communicated to the public is by voluntary display on the
company’s own public website.67 In practice, this leaves community members and potential investors relying solely on reporting and assessment produced by the company. Further, the third-party carrying out the company’s
assessment for this report is entirely within the control of the company.68
The third-party standard set forth in The BCA is perhaps the most easily
identifiable area ripe for immediate redrafting. The legislative intent of outside evaluation is independent evaluation in reviewing a company’s practices
as they impact their stated general and specific purposes.69 The required degree of separation between the B Corp and the third-party evaluator is a simplistic misnomer in today’s available analytical assessment tools for social
value.70 In Illinois, B Corps may enlist any qualifying entity as long as there
61. Ercoline, supra note 59, 172-74.
62. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/5.01(8)(c) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for
portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
63. Id.
64. Model Benefit Corporation, supra note 28.
65. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 29.
66. Id.
67. For example, Mightybytes, a full-service creative firm for conscious companies
displays its report along with supplementary information. See MIGHTYBYTES, MIGHTYBYTES
2013 BENEFIT REPORT (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.mightybytes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/2013benefitreport_finallegal.pdf. Contra CMTY. FIRST MED. CTR.,
http://www.cfmedicalcenter.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) (Community First Medical Center, a healthcare facility does not display information remotely relating to it B Corp status).
68. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10(1)-(5) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for
portions of P.A. 99-912, 2012 Reg. .ess.@ A5Third-party standard- definition@.
69. Id.
70. Other measurement designs implemented by social purpose organizations, include: Balanced Scorecards, a strategic planning and management system focused on key financial and non-financial indicators: people and knowledge, internal, customer, and financial;
Social Return on Investment (SROI) is grounded in a set of principles that are applied within
a framework including values of people to give a voice to resource-allocation decisions; Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) is often applied for large corporations, mergers,
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is no financial relationship and they have access to necessary and appropriate
expertise.71 To maintain B Corp status, the evaluation and subsequent reports
must be executed on a yearly basis.72 While this alone adds another task to a
busy officer’s duties> the costs incurred to a B Corp for this evaluation process typically ranges from $500 to $50,000.73
While corporate jurisprudence leaves a trail of questionable standards
and enforcement, B Corps are not absolved from all legal enforcement of
their managerial decisions under The BCA.74 Benefit Enforcement Proceedings allow shareholders to bring an action for non-compliance with managerial requirements deemed necessary to pursue or create the identified general
and specific purpose.75 Unlike traditional shareholder actions, only injunctive
relief may be ordered and monetary damages are not available.76 No litigation
directly involving B Corp governance has been brought before Illinois courts,
again rendering the effectiveness of this enforcement provision under The
BCA a mere afterthought for B Corps, investors, and the communities they
serve.77
Lacking effective legal mechanisms to communicate and enforce the B
Corps’ purpose> traditional corporate narratives and practices will continue
to dilute the distinguishing purpose of the B Corp. Issues with capital formation, implementation of social value objectives, and long-term viability
for the B Corp as a form of social enterprise is questionable.78

and portfolio managers looking to garner information on long-term performance advantages,
risk profiles> and 'ualifications of a company’s management and other characteristics$ .ocial
Accountability 8000 (SA8000) is a compliance standard that is the world’s first auditable so<
cial certification for qualifying decent workplaces across all industrial sectors based on conventions of the ILO, UN, and national law. PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 168-70.
71. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1.10(2), (4) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except
for portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
72. Id.
73. A company with annual sales between $0 - $149,999 charged an annual fee of
$500, while a company with annual sales upwards from $2 million - $4,999,999 charged an
annual fee of $1,500, and a company with annual sales of $1 billion+ charged an annual fee
of $50,000+. Make It Official, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/howto-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official-2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
74. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.20 (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for portions of P.A. 99-912, 2012 Reg. .ess.@ A5Right of action$ benefit enforcement proceeding-@.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Blair & Pollman, supra note 37,1738-42 (2015).
78. Dana B. Reiser, Benefit Corporations – A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 592-96 (2011).
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THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IS RIPE FOR ACTIVATION

5,ltimately> managers need to think about their company’s social per<
formance not just because their license to operate might in some way be restricted if they fail to respond to social pressures . . . New capitalists want
companies to treat customers, suppliers, workers, and communities fairly.-79
Outdated formalistic paradigms identify the social enterprise supply fulfilled
by non-profits, charities, or foundations and consumer demand by activists,
eco-impact investors, or philanthropic donors.80 Coined 5the new corporate
agenda- the marketplace for corporations pursuing social enterprise endeav<
ors presents opportunity for outweighing outdated rigid principles limiting
the available market potential.81
Social enterprise focused corporations are emerging as a domestic and
international hot topic in response to shifts within the global corporate ecosystem.82 Regardless of the type of social enterprise a company chooses to
incorporate as, any company pursuing social value creation today faces similar issues of funding, implementation, enforcement, and measurement to
sidestep short-term solutions and focus on long-term viability to pursue and
sustain capital growth.83
A.

DOMESTIC ACTIVATION

The concept of the social purpose corporate form has enjoyed wide bipartisan support.84 For example> Pennsylvania’s .ecretary of Commonwealth, Republican Secretary Carole Aichele stated
There are entrepreneurs who want to create, investors who want to finance, and consumers who want
to do business with companies which have publicly
made a commitment to better their communities and
79. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 213.
80. See generally JEANNE C. MEISTER & KARIE WILLYERD, THE 2020 WORKPLACE:
HOW INNOVATIVE COMPANIES ATTRACT, DEVELOP, AND KEEP TOMORROW’S EMPLOYEES
TODAY (2010).
81. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 213.
82. MATTHEW J. KIERNAN, INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE WORLD: WHY GREEN IS
THE NEW COLOR OF MONEY ON WALL STREET 98 (2009).
83. Id. at 84-96.
84. As stated by Hemocratic Governor 9ack Markell from Helaware: 5Public benefit
corporations will harness the power of private enterprise to create public benefit . . . such
companies ‘consider profit to be the means—not the exclusive end goal—of their business.’Mike Issac & David Gellas, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism Over Profit, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstarters-altruistic-vision-profits-as-the-means-not-the-mission.html?_r=0.
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their environment as a part of their business model,
. . . By giving them the option to do so in Pennsylvania, Gov. Corbett has said our state is open for
business to, and actively working to attract, these
companies and the jobs they bring with them.85
!merica’s roots in capitalism ensure the future of the social enterprise’s pur<
pose will survive when they yield monetary value as recognized by each
player within the ecosystem.86
Heloitte’s 2013 survey of CE/’s found their top five priorities to be:
customers, growth, performance, innovation, and cost seen consistently
across industries.87 Hrivers behind a community’s choice to consume goods
and services have notably shifted to focus on the customer journey that reinforces long-term engagement redefining the timeless loyalty loop88 while balancing frugal spending habits.89 Consumer behaviors demand both cost-effectiveness of big-corporate economic power and increased social value creation. Without a structured system to meet both demands, the opportunity for
a social enterprise to capture these consumers is slim.
Separation of powers issues aside, federal law plays a primary role in
mitigating the authority and powers derived from corporate law.90 The Hobby
Lobby decision classified a corporation as equivalent to the persons using its
authority in the eyes of the law because those individuals are using the corporation to achieve their desired ends.91 Evidenced in the Illinois Business
Corporation !ct of 1013> a business’s articles of incorporation must set forth
5the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized, which may
85. PA. DEP’T OF STATE, Pennsylvania &egisters 5irst “Benefit Corporations,” Im8
plements New Law to Attract Socially, Environmentally-Conscious Business, PR NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 22, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pennsylvania-registersfirst-benefit-corporations-implements-new-law-to-attract-socially-environmentally-conscious-businesses-187936431.html (Tom Corbett, Republican Party Governor of Pennsylvania until January 20, 2015) (reporting from Pennsylvania Department of State on the importance of supporting B Corp development through effective legislation).
86. KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 98.
87. Khalid Kark, Mark White, Bill Bridges & Anjali Shaikh, Navigating Legacy:
Charting the Course to Business Value, DELOITTE UNIV. PRESS (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://dupress.com/articles/global-cio-survey/?id=us:2el:3dc:dup1264:eng:cons:ciosurvey:dcpromo.
88. David C. Edelman & Marc Singer, Competing on Customer Journeys, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/11/competing-on-customer-journeys.
89. Anne Martinez, Rukhshana Motiwala & Ali Sher, America the Frugal: US Consumer Sentiment Survey, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/consumer_and_retail/america_the_frugal_us_consumer_sentiment_survey.
90. Verity Winship, Teaching Federal Corporate Law, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 21819 (2013).
91. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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be stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful businesses .
. . .-92 From terminology 5lawful business>- which is often embodied as for
any 5lawful purpose>- stems the debate surrounding the legal basis for a corporation’s legal liability to take managerial liberties.93 The debate cyclically
turns on how much autonomous decision-making authority is vested in a corporation’s officers.94 The four dissenting opinions in the Hobby Lobby decision demonstrates this reluctance to draw a bright line.95
State and federal case law provides even less guidance than the ominous
Hobby Lobby Supreme Court opinion, unsurprisingly, current events follow
suit demonstrating the imminent economic injury resulting from the difficulty among courts to establish a legal framework.96
June 2015, a commercial aircraft transporting 141 passengers was emergency landed on its departing runway.97 After detecting smoke, the pilot radioed air traffic control seeking permission to evacuate, an unidentified voice
responded urging the pilot to 5hold off on evacuating the plane . . . .-98 After
two calls to air traffic were not returned, the pilot exercised his best judgment
to evacuate the passengers.99 Several weeks later, the pilot received notice of
his termination.100 !llegiant !ir’s motion to remove the case to federal court
was denied> the case is currently pending in 7evada’s Eighth 9udicial Histrict
Court.101
According to Federal Aviation Administration regulations, the pilot has
the responsibility for emergency decision-making.102 The pilot emphasized
5FheE felt the best decision was to get FpassengersE to safety and get them
away from an airplane that was smoking.-103 Alleging the airline valued financial profit over the safety of the passengers> the pilot’s suit contends no
92. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10(a)(2) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for
portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
93. Id.; Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
94. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10(a)(2) (Lexis through P.A. 99-932, except for
portions of P.A. 99-912, 2016 Reg. Sess.); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
95. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. L.
1, 14, 23-26 (2015).
96. See supra notes 8, 35, 41, 51.
97. David Kerley & Erin Dooley, Ex-Pilot Sues Allegiant for 'Malicious' Firing After
Emergency
Evacuation,
ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
13,
2015,
8:12
AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/pilot-sues-allegiant-malicious-firing-emergencyevacuation/story?id=35165366.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Kinzer v Allegiant Air, LLC, No. A-15-727524-C, 2016 WL 3176570 (D. Nev.
June 1, 2016) (order denying motion to dismiss and motion to extend time as moot).
102. 14 C.F.R. % 01.3Ab@ A2013@ Astipulating authority to 5deviate from any rule of this
part to the extent re'uired to meet that emergency-@.
103. Kerley & Dooley, supra note 97.
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pilot should be forced to consider employment termination, media exposure,
or bottom line spending when it comes to decision-making in the interest of
safety.104 The airline has not made comments or filed an answer to the pilot’s
suit.105 The pilot seeks damages for wrongful termination, defamation, and
infliction of emotional distress.106
The airline’s response to the plane evacuation during and after the controversial event saw the diffusion of seemingly financially based business
decisions which were not impacted by the weight of any potential legal ramifications. Without material evidence like internal corporate documents,107
one can only ponder how much weight a costly plane evacuation or employment of a pilot who is not willing to take on a smoking plane is given when
a corporation’s priority is the maximiBation of shareholder value. While
America is caught up in prudential limitations, the international arena is not
only addressing the issue head on, it is trailblazing and setting an example
for productive social value creation.108
B.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVATION

59ust about every company on earth stands to be impacted by the .us<
tainable :nvestment Revolution.-109 International response to understanding
and capitalizing on social value is exceedingly more proactive than domestic
legislative and judicial consideration. Most international legislation, having
been enacted in the last five years, exemplifies the evolving rhetoric surrounding the growing movement to activate underutilized resources to deliver both social and economic benefits.110 The following three remedies for
maximizing social value are offered to provide perspective on the state of
U.S. legislative efforts to date.
The European Parliament amended its Accounting Directive in 2015 requiring all European Union (EU) Member States to modify their respective
financial reporting requirements to include publication of information by
public interest entities that impact the communities they serve.111 Changes
include mandates for public-interest entities to disclose in their management
reports relevant and useful information on their policies, including risks, and
104. Kerley & Dooley, supra note 97.
105. Kerley & Dooley, supra note 97.
106. Kinzer, 2016 WL 3176570, at *1 (D. Nev. June 1, 2016).
107. See supra text accompanying note 43.
108. KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 98.
109. KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 99.
110. Ta’eed et. al.> supra note 51.
111. European Commission Consults on Non-Binding Guidelines on Disclosure of
Non-Financial Information By Certain Large Companies, EUROPEAN COMM. PRESS RELEASE
DATABASE (Jan. 15, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-15-01-2016.htm?locale=en#5.

2017]

READY TO RE-LAUNCH: FIXING THE PITCH FOR THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE

357

outcomes relating to: environmental matters, social and employee aspects,
respect for human rights, anticorruption and bribery, and diversity.112 The
directive mandates that each Member State must codify these changes in their
national legislation by December 2016.113
Among an impressive array of forward-thinking legislation, the United
Kingdom’s Social Value Act of 2012, requires local government agents to
assess the social value opportunity in its contract selection process.114
Awarded contracts must consider: 5Aa@ how what is proposed to be procured
might improve the economic, social, and environmental well-being of the
relevant area, and (b) how, in conducting the process of procurement, it might
act with a view to securing that improvement.-115 Requiring consideration in
section Aa@ of the contract’s effect on a respective area’s economic> social>
and environmental well-being before the procurement process begins, goes
beyond mere ‘consideration’ by engaging section Ab@ in a system to capture
ROI metrics throughout the life of the contract.116 The Centre for Citizenship
Enterprise and Governance has proposed a public portal to capture intangible
values based on the ‘well-being’ of a respective community to a contract at
no cost to public organizations.117
India has enacted one of the most prescriptive solutions for social value
creation under its Companies Act of 2013.118 The Act requires large corporations to donate at minimum 2% of their annual gross profits towards activities focused on social responsibility.119 Corporations must publicly report
these expenditures detailing the beneficiaries.120 Failure to meet the 2% donation minimum results in personal liability at the corporate director level by
imposition of fines or imprisonment.121 Enforcing legislation with tangible
mechanisms, like monetary fines or imprisonment, aligns the social value
consideration with other common managerial duties warranting attention
from officers expected to execute the intended results.

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Examples of forward-thinking legislation from the U.K. include: Localism Act
A2011@> .ustainable Communities !ct A2007@> Local Government !ct ‘Best +alue’ A1000@>
and Directive 92/50 EEC Horizontal Policies for Procurement (1992).
115. THE STATIONARY OFFICE LTD. (U.K.), PUBLIC SERVICES (SOCIAL VALUE) ACT
2012,
c.
3,
§1(3)
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/3/pdfs/ukpga_20120003_en.pdf.
116. Id.
117. Ta’eed et. al.> supra note 51, at 5.
118. Investment Climate Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 23 (June 2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228508.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Aligning social value with other corporate considerations is propelling
countries like :ndia from the ‘developed market’ to the ‘emerging market’
category.122 Emerging markets are currently identified among the BRIC
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and the Next Eleven (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South
Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam).123 These countries represent four billion individuals earning less than $1,500 annually, who can be better engaged through
productive legislation like the European Parliament’s procurement proce<
dures, the United Kingdom’s contract selection process> and :ndia’s donation
enforcement.124
The expediency demonstrated within these three legislative changes
stands in stark contrast to the current state of U.S. judiciaries and legislatures,
the latter of which still needs to establish a foundation for the issue, before it
can generate momentum to provide effective legislation to find the right solution. Global markets are fostering the normative shift towards incorporating social value creation and evaluation in strategies to develop 5increasingly
dynamic and attractive markets- the ,... needs to extend its efforts to follow
suit.125

IV.

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE OUTLOOK

Separation of powers ideology does not preclude Madison’s Federalist
No. 10 notion that an enlightened statesmen will not inherently hold his/her
interests as subservient to the public good.126 Madison’s contention is alive
and aptly connected by a common denominator> the 5public good- which
translates today to communities supporting the social enterprise vehicle to
pursue self-serving profit and greater-good social value creation goals.127 The
popular limited liability company was based on novel German legislation
during the 1980-00s in response to 5innovative professionals creating solu<
tions when the current legal system fails to meet client needs.-128 Flowing
from these profound moments in our country’s history> the factors explored
in this Comment—state and federal legislative complexities, community
branding misconceptions, and international headway in social value procurement—place the U.S. in a historically prime position to take on the social
enterprise innovation professionals widely endorse. Bridging the gap towards

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 103-04.
KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 104.
See supra notes 114, 115, 118.
KIERNAN, supra note 82, at 104.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
Id.
Hamill, supra note 2.
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the next step to continue the momentum of the social enterprise solution requires analysis of the funding, implementation, enforcement, and measurement mechanisms to achieve long-term innovation.
A.

ISSUE: FUNDING

Success in the U.S. free market capitalist ecosystem is driven by supply
and demand.129 Focusing on private and public sector corporate structures
fueled by the forces of supply and demand, lends to simple solutions to mobilize a nascent investor market.130 Companies with a proclivity to operate
under social enterprise values are varied in legal corporate classification and
operational practices, however, forces mediating the barriers to market acceptance by investors likewise apply.131

1.

Private Sector Solutions

Identifying investor types lends to general classifications: activist,
money hungry, or trying to make a quick buck.132 For the token ‘good will’
activist investor type, common areas of focus are: partnership, philanthropy,
and socially responsible practices, are commonly an afterthought investment
option within a well-rounded portfolio.133 Common knowledge dictates the
ROI expectations for this 5good will- investment set are virtually unprotected. It must evolve to be recognized as an essential cornerstone of a diversified investment portfolio to overcome this branding misconception currently placing it among the first to liquidate.134 Many solutions to reconfigure
branding problems utilize do-gooder rhetoric to raise concepts surrounding
impact investing, crowd sourcing, social entrepreneurship and the like.135
Despite being a niche category, social enterprises source an avid consumer movement at the helm of socially responsible practices.136 Taking to
the numbers, during the 2008-11 recession, 75% of small businesses saw an

129. See Capitalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
130. KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWD-FUNDING REVOLUTION 21, 33
(2013) (Figure 2.1 demonstrating an exponentially increasing rate of change, and Figure 2.2
the funding pyramid).
131. Reiser, supra note 78, at 624.
132. Granum, supra note 14, at 779.
133. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 130, at 72-75.
134. David A. Levitt & Steven R. Chiodini, Taking Care of Business: Use of a ForProfit Subsidiary by a Nonprofit Organization, 2014 BUS. L. TODAY (June 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/06/03_levitt.html; LAWTON & MAROM,
supra note 130, at 72-75.
135. LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 130, at 72-75.
136. Reiser, supra note 78, at 622.
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increase in green product sales;137 $3 billion was raised by crowdfunding in
2013, doubling from the $1.5 billion raised in 2011;138 Harvard’s Michael
Jensen focused on a handful of private companies to estimate some $500 billion lost due to poor management from 1977-88.139 Consumer demand and
corporate supply potential evidently exists among the branding confusion in
the marketplace.140
The most notable frontrunner among the investment options available
to social enterprise interested consumers was recently adopted under the federal JOBS Act crowdfunding exemption.141 Crowdfunding finds momentum
within an investor set identifying with social value creation and having little
expectation of return on overall investment.142 Success among websites facilitating crowdfunding such as Kickstarter, Razoo, and StartSomeGood,143
demonstrate the emerging panacea of consumer driven marketplace ideology.144 While investor sentiments towards the crowdfunding mechanism are
varied> considered alongside numbers reporting growth in the ‘activist’ con<
sumer segment, a strong argument is made for the emergence of a new investor type placing importance on both profit and social value purpose in investment selection.

2.

Public Sector Solutions

Traditional government supported remedies can support social enterprise growth, among many examples include Philadelphia and San Francisco.
In 2012 Philadelphia became the first city in the nation to provide a tax incentive to certified B Corps under the PA Tax Credit Act.145 The incentive

137. Reiser, supra note 78, at 622.
138. Eamonn Kelly, Introduction: Business Ecosystems Come of Age, DELOITTE UNIV.
PRESS (Apr. 15, 2015) http://dupress.com/articles/business-ecosystems-come-of-age-business-trends/.
139. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 11.
140. Reiser, supra note 78, at 624.
141. Press Release> ,... .ec. ( Exch. Comm’n> .EC !dopts Rules to Permit Crowd<
funding (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html.
142. Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction
IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 222-24 (2015).
143. KICKSTARTER, www.kickstarter.com (last visited Jan 12, 2015); RAZOO, www.razoo.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); START SOME GOOD, http://startsomegood.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
144. See generally LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 130.
145. Kyle Westaway, Profit + Purpose, STAN. UNIV. LECTURE SERIES (Apr. 9, 2012)
(downloaded using iTunesU); see also City of Philadelphia Sustainable Business Tax Credit
§505 107-9 (last updated Jan. 11, 2017) https://beta.phila.gov/services/payments-assistancetaxes/tax-credits/sustainable-business-tax-credit/.
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qualifies sustainable enterprises to receive up to $4,000 in tax credits.146 San
Francisco passed an ordinance> the 5Benefit Corporation Hiscount- granting
B Corps a bidding preference on city contracts.147 The ordinance provides a
4% advantage when determining the highest ranked or apparent lowest bid
during each stage of the proposal selection process.148 While tax incentives
and contract preference provisions are tools that may enhance the short-term
viability for a social enterprise, local governments can offer far greater longterm support by embracing non-traditional mechanisms.149
The Gateway EB-5 Investor Visa is adopted under the United States
CitiBenship and :mmigration .ervice’s program.150 The program grants a total of 10,000 permanent resident visas throughout the country, per year, facilitating investments between communities with an immediate need for capital formation and international investors seeking permanent U.S. residency.151 A qualifying investment generates over ten jobs and recognizes
value to the recipient community between $500,000 to $1 million.152 Besides
being a directly measureable value add, this program exemplifies a non-traditional government resource that can be better utilized by incremental
changes to focus on developing social enterprises to support long-term
growth for both the company and the recipient communities. Connecting the
concept of innovative social value creation with existing resources sits at the
crux of underutilized market-making potential in the U.S.153
B.

ISSUE: IMPLEMENTATION

Traditional government supported remedies can support social enterprise growth. All necessary players—corporations, consumers, and state and
federal government—must be agile in responding to mounting tensions

146. City of Philadelphia Sustainable Business Tax Credit §505 107-9 (last updated
Jan. 11, 2017) https://beta.phila.gov/services/payments-assistance-taxes/tax-credits/sustainable-business-tax-credit/.
147. S. F. ADMIN. CODE 3 (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.sfbos.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=41408.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681, 692 (2012-13).
150. About
GCGRC,
GREEN
CARD
GATEWAY
REG’L
CTR,
http://www.gcgrc.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
151. The EB-5 Visa: Immigration, GREEN CARD GATEWAY REG’L CTR,
http://www.gcgrc.com/immigration/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
152. Id.
153. DAVIS ET AL, supra note 11.
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within the ecosystem to build and maintain credibility throughout the establishment of the social enterprise.154 Case studies detailing efforts by Starbucks and Accenture towards social value creation provide an argument for
implementing governmental resources to strengthen existing collaborations,
one obvious method of better facilitating non-profit collaborations.

1.

Case Studies: Starbucks & Accenture

Large-scale corporations frequently implement programs targeting social value objectives while leaving the potential to maximize their ROI on
the table.155 The first example found in the Starbucks collaboration with Arizona State University (ASU) to create a College Achievement Plan
(CAP).156 The CAP offers all Starbucks employees full benefits including
tuition coverage for a bachelor’s degree.157 The collaboration utiliBes !.,’s
education platform to provide a dedicated team of advisors, 24/7 tutoring, a
choice of over 50 degrees, and flexibility for the future with no requirement
to continue employment with Starbucks upon graduation.158
The relationships created by the CAP are synonymous with the maximiBation of each stakeholder’s return on investment: Starbucks employees
can earn a degree with no tuition price tag attached and receive enhanced
resources for success, the Starbucks company earns a loyal workforce to
power its consistent and customer centric service model, and ASU receives
a tuition revenue opportunity. These collaborations are all without question
mutually beneficial transactions that work to elevate each parties’ potential
for success above what it would be without the CAP.
!ccenture’s Hevelopment Partnership A!HP@ program> allows employees to donate their personal consulting service time to form unique partnerships within emerging economies.159 !HP’s goal is to allow high performing
employees the opportunity to build and expand global mobility and leadership skills, while affording ADP clients the best talent available.160 Sander

154. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 170,
177 (2012) (explaining flexibility in the corporate form).
155. Id.
156. Starbucks College Achievement Plan, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/careers/college-plan (last visited Jan. 12, 2016) (the program facilitates employee growth as a
person, as a partner within their individual career, and the community).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Development Partnerships Impact Report, ACCENTURE, (June 2012),
https://www.accenture.com/ph-en/~/media/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Industries_10/Accenture-Development-Partnerships-Impact-Report.pdf.
160. Id.
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van’t 7oordende> !ccenture Group Chief Executive of !ccenture Manage<
ment Consulting, explains the collaborative nature of a 2013 partnership with
+odafone and /xfam 5to develop a mobile technology strategy to enable
improved productivity and economic value for small-holder farmers in 26
markets across !frica> !sia and Latin !merica.-161 The mutually beneficial
nature of this collaboration is undeniable, for Accenture: the employee personal satisfaction, enhanced framework for unique solution development,
identification of future business; and for !ccenture’s clients: access to the
top talent and network of corporate resources, expanding their global network.162
The Starbucks and Accenture programs exemplify how a for-profit
company can foster innovation, impact, and leadership within a local community or global reach while productively serving their respective interest.
Clearly, these collaborations cannot exist absent each party to the transaction’s performance. While within the broad scope of corporate powers, CAP
and ADP can thrive, the framework to move these collaborations beyond the
scope of the enlightened statesmen within board room may require the government to incentivize each party, taking control of the helm as history
proved with the creation of the LLC, to provide the legitimacy of rule of law
while simultaneously advancing corporate benefits, like tax changes, while
creating public good.163

2.

NON-PROFIT COLLABORATION

Resources to structure the non-profit and for-profit arenas are by no
means a recent innovation.164 Mechanisms to encourage both parties to engage in partnerships exist within the federal tax structure under the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).165 Underutilization of these mechanisms due to simple issues relating to taxation and processing result in unproductive spending

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See THE FEDERALIST 7o. 10 A9ames Madison@ A5:t is in vain to say that enlight<
ened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient
to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.-@.
164. Susanah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Codes For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118
PENN. ST. L. REV. 489 (2014).
165. Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) applies to income derived from a regularly carried on trade or business that is unrelated to the performance of the organiBation’s taxexempt functions as filed with the federal government in their mission statement. There is no
bright-line for how much unrelated business activity is too much for a nonprofit to conduct
before incurring tax ramifications as demonstrated by federal tax law’s unclear application to
circumstances warranting an unrelated activity to a non-profit’s tax-exempt purpose. Levitt &
Chiodini, supra note 133(publication of the American Bar Association); INTERNAL REVENUE
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and difficulty in establishing long-term strategy. Identified below are three
easily remedied tax difficulties that make the :R.’s resources highly unlikely
sources of support for socially productive mutually beneficial programs like
the CAP and ADP.166 Entities that typically collaborate with private corporations qualify for tax exemptions as either a non-profit or association, meaning
they encompass a gathering of people for a common purpose.167 Focusing on
the structure behind tax incentives for private corporate partnerships with
qualified non-profits reveals a clear trend of substantial impediments to continued long-term viability in these partnerships.
First, financial planning issues associated with tax deductions and credits. Both private and non-profit entities use deductions and credits in a similar
manner to adjust their annual gross income (AGI) as necessary for ongoing
financial strategy.168 Deductions are taken at the beginning of the calculation
process, one subtracts each deduction producing the total taxable income figure, to which the applicable tax rate is applied.169 Should a deduction be later
denied by the IRS, these figures will adjust accordingly.170 Tax credits are
taken at the end of the process, one subtracts the credit from the final amount
of tax due.171
If a deduction or credit is later denied by the IRS, the effects on a company’s financial reporting and strategy are significant as they can place a
company’s total taxable income within an entirely new tax rate or increase
the total amount of tax due.172 Looking through a corporate strategy lens, if
Starbucks was interested in implementing their CAP program nationally,
only assessing financial drivers, to offset the increased implementation costs
SERV., U.S. Department of the Treasury, IRS Publication 598, Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, Cat. No. 46598X (Rev. Jan. 2015)
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf. Project Related Investments (PRI) allow an exception to the traditional requirement that non-profit foundations must release a minimum of 5%
percent of its value yearly (initially imposed to discourage non-profits not actively using
funds), allowing the 5% percent to be invested in a private corporation if it ultimately serves
a charitable purpose. PROFITS & PURPOSE, supra note 3; see also Program-Related Investments, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/Charities&-Non-Profits/Private-Foundations/Program-Related-Investments.
166. Tahk, supra note 164, at 489.
167. Qualified tax exempt entities are 5organiBed and operated exclusively for reli<
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals . . . .- 22 ,...C. % 301Ac@A3@ A201@.
168. Compliance Guide for Tax-Exempt Organizations (Other than 501(c)(3) Public
Charities and Private Foundations), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 13-15 (2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221nc.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.

2017]

READY TO RE-LAUNCH: FIXING THE PITCH FOR THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE

365

they might claim a deduction or tax credits for any tuition monies they provided for their employees. Should the deduction or credit later be denied, the
reassessment of the taxable income or tax due figures would make a financial
advisor largely adverse to the idea of implementing this program due to the
uncertainty represented by the risk in the government’s role. Because of the
varied endemic accounting and reporting projection issues, corporate tax advisors often look outside of the government’s system creating unnecessarily
complex vehicles to 5allow these ventures to carry out their activities while
complying with the law.-173
Second, uncertainty surrounding direct expenses necessitating government assistance to enable social value based collaborations.174 Federal tax
law does not clarify how corporations should treat social purpose direct expenses commonly related to incentive programs or charitable contributions.175 Consider an officer at !ccenture assessing next year’s agenda for
presentation to the board of directors. When deciding whether to present
plans to expand a social value based project within the existing ADP program
or another purely profit generating program, the officer will initially employ
the same evaluation methodology. However, for the social value ADP program> to 4ustify the intangible ‘income’ goodwill> that cannot be set off by
direct profit yield (e.g. employee personal gratification or future business potential in developing markets), the officer will need to include the tax benefit
to even give the program a chance against the alternative purely profit based
program. To generate reliable figures, given the necessary tax benefit, the
officer may also need to consider hiring tax counsel to research or provide a
reasonable estimate of the amount and any uncertainty that the IRS could
reject the tax benefit. Even if the officer diligently pursued the ADP program
and cogently communicated to the board of directors its financial factors, the
likelihood that a program having a financial factor outside of the company’s
control will be chosen over another project with market growth uncertainty
that can be altered at any time within the company’s control is comparably
grim.176 As a result, social value based projects will almost always see the
reduction in the available corporate resources allocation.177 If the financial
factors present in these decisions had a strong foundation of legal clarity, the
officer’s task towards social value creation would be less onerous.
173. Tahk, supra note 164, at 514 (5However> designers of these vehicles have had to
contend with operating outside of the tax law's existing frameworks. Their vehicles all have
been forced to use an apparatus that was not intended to accommodate the new inter-field
developments and that has not been retooled to do so.-@.
174. Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, U.
ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1876 (2014).
175. Id.
176. Tahk, supra note 164, at 515.
177. Tahk, supra note 164, at 516.
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Third, IRS resources are ultimately not intended for social value collaborations.178 !n obvious solution to the officer’s problem in forecasting po<
tential IRS financial incentives is to obtain an advanced approval from the
government to provide assurances where the IRS involvement is a prohibiting factor. Licensed non-profits can file for pre-approval of large contributions, or simply use historically approved similar transactions to justify a financial factor when working to achieve potential collaboration.179 Common
issues with IRS processing time can delay or completely eliminate potential
collaborations.180 While transactions naturally encompass an element of liability, the :R.’s process for qualifying non-profits as tax-exempt entities
does not factor in collaborations between non-profit and for-profit entities
and was not intended to accommodate these collaborations.181
Developments in federal taxation law will embolden corporate officers
interested in taking advantage of financially solvent social value transactions.
To foster growth in social value transactions between non-profit and forprofit entities our government must provide and maintain credible resources
to ensure long-term growth and viability.
C.

ISSUE: LONG-TERM VIABILITY

Financial value is easily captured using quantitatively established reporting tools like the stock exchange or interest rates. Capturing social value
combines quantitative and qualitative measurements, empirical by nature
with a limited set of unauthenticated reporting tools to be drawn upon.182
Clearly there is need for developing a definition so social value currency may
be uniformly adopted and understood to advance today’s corporate ecosystem.

1.

ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement ensuring accountability validates the social value currency
as a resource within the market. Currency forms left unregulated historically

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Reiser, supra note 78, at 622-24.
Tahk, supra note 164, at 521-32.
Tahk, supra note 164, at 514-16.
Tahk, supra note 164, at 514-16.
See KIERNAN, supra note 82.
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do not survive, for example, the rise and fall of the trendy bitcoin digital currency.183 While any form of capital success needs validation by an uninterested third party entity, regulation that is recognized and respected by market
drivers will traditionally succeed.184
The .ecurities and Exchange Commission A.EC@ serves to 5protect in<
vestors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.-185 While the .EC’s intricate regulatory structure provides back<
bone to the corporate ecosystem, it leaves ethical matters such as disclosures
re'uired for 5Amendments to the Registrant’s Code of Ethics, or the Waiver
of a Provision of the Code of Ethics- 186 to vague language, simply because
ethics do not legislate. While notions of ethical standards are a positive consideration> 5vague ideas of profitability or social good are not sufficient for
leading for-purpose organiBations.-187
Regulatory mechanisms offered by the SEC within the last 15 years
have performed a defensive rather offensive role in responding to changing
economic indicators.188 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enhances corporate
responsibility; the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 further reshapes the regulatory system focusing on disclosure
and transparency; the JOBS Act of 2012 provides a positive outlook for the
future of social value regulation via crowdfunding.189 The trickle-down effect
of defensive reactionary regulation leads to difficulty in implementation and
compliance for these programs$ for example> following the bitcoin’s 'uick
rise to popularity within the U.S. markets, state banking regulators scrambled
to piece together solutions for effective regulation.190
Until the reporting requirements and enforcement offered by government agencies catch up to the chameleon-like qualities of the new capitalist
ecosystem, we will continue to see growing pains in regulatory action backtracking to keep up with investor-led value creation.191
183. See generally Conrad Bahlke et al., Recent Developments in the Regulatory Treatment of Bitcoin, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. (2016), http://www.stroock.com/siteFiles/Publications/IPTechJnlBitcoin.pdf.
184. Id.
185. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
186. Amendments to the &egistrant’s Code of 6thics, or Waiver of a Provision of the
Code of Ethics, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Form 8-K Item 5.05 (expires Mar. 31, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
187. PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 168.
188. What We Do, supra note 185.
189. What We Do, supra note 185.
190. Bahlke et al., supra note 182 (in response to extensive bitcoin activity, U.S. state
banking regulators have indicated that financial regulatory requirements involving third parties should extend to bitcoin and other virtual currency activity).
191. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 213.
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MEASUREMENT

Measuring social value as a quantitative calculation matches the vague
quality of ethical valuations.192 Courts typically addressed social value as an
indirect economic benefit conferred.193 The Pfeiffer court used the corporate
benefit doctrine to apply a damage calculation for withdrawal of stock offering.194 The court assessed a substantive corporate benefit based on factors
such as employee morale, attraction, and retention as non-measureable economic terms.195 The court’s opinion drew upon 5conscience and reason, as
opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness- in ensuring 5an orderly and logi<
cal deductive process.-196
Real-Time Information (RTI) capabilities must be achieved to legitimize the transparency, demonstrate successes and failure to all players, and
provide a quantifiable unit for the enforcement structure.197 A multitude of
reporting structures are currently utilized;198 among the swelling tide of reporting practices, each faces problems cited by all parties to the transaction
as too expensive, overly complex, resource intensive, subjective, easily-challenged, difficult to articulate and niche.
On paper, a corporation’s pro4ect assessment strategy flows naturally
within a quarterly segmented financial calendar allowing officers to understand and communicate a social impact story internally and externally, strategically make decisions, and reap financial benefits.199 In practice, social

192. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 213.
193. Pfeiffer v. Begley, 2015 IL App (2d) 140271, ¶13, 27 N.E.3d 670, 675-76 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015).
194. Id.
195. See Id. (citing Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1165 (Del.1989))
A5While the benefit achieved may have an indirect economic effect on the corporation> in the
sense that the interests of the plaintiff class reflect a value not theretofore apparent, the benefit
need not be measurable in economic terms. Changes in corporate policy or, as here, a heightened level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may justify
an award of counsel fees.-@.
196. Id. at ¶20.
197. PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 169.
198. Sample of measurement techniques include: Classic Balanced Scorecards:
measures four quadrants financial and non-financial indicators (people and knowledge, internal, customer, financial); Social Return on Investment (SROI): incorporates people as a value
within the resource-allocation decision-making structure; Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) known for larger corporate long-term investment analysis technique incorporating
quality of corporate management, culture, risk profile among many characteristic based factors; Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000), used in the industrial platform, an auditable certification standard creates a common language measuring social compliance, often cited for
protecting basic human workers’ rights. PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 169.
199. PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 171.
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impact mission measurement, setting up standards and processes, and sustaining the necessary measurement and reporting through the fulfillment
stage finds social value based projects met with severe opposition on the corporate calendar.200 Setting management operations, partnerships, supply
chain structure, and company financials aside, the same pragmatic mindset
currently at work within for-profit corporations who consistently overcome
funding, implementation, enforcement and measurement issues, are certainly
able to achieve social value creation, capture and maximization to achieve
purpose within its capitalist structure.

V.

CONCLUSION

The B Corp social enterprise model may be the current trend, merely a
means to an end. What remains consistent to the end of social value creation
is the social enterprise’s role in making generations of profit and social value
an increasingly worthy purpose reflected within U.S. consumerism. Struggling within the tensions of government regulation and natural market
forces—the end for social value’s relevance emerging as a form of capital
can be found in better funding mechanisms, implementation structure, enforcement and measurement issues that today strains the success of the social
enterprise.
As the model social enterprise form, this Comment used the Illinois B
Corp to demonstrate the basic principle and structure of the dual-mission,
for-profit entity. Limited by branding, financing, transparency, and lax third
party enforcement mechanisms, the future is not green for the Illinois B Corp.
The nationally developing pedagogy of the duties and liabilities of the corporation and its actors must pace with the international community to understand how to remain competitive and support social value creation within our
agencies, legislature, and judiciary.
Promotion and growth of the social enterprise as a vehicle for social
value means each player within a collaborative nexus readjust individual interests to work in productive tension. Corporate social responsibility is about
protecting the company and acting in the best interests of the company. The
evolving concept of social value dating back to the literal price paid for a
person’s head201 is grounded in protection of individual(s) as the community’s assets and subse'uent actions in the best interests of the entire com<
munity. Although the narratives and concepts explored in this Comment
should be challenged by the possibilities formal fallacy lends for its law in

200.
201.

PROFIT & PURPOSE, supra note 3, at 171.
Capitis aestimatio, supra note 1.
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action approach,202 it is without question the infallible supply and demand
forces that drive our capitalist economy boil down to the simple modus ponens that will always result in command of necessary actions by a community
when the true social value of an individual as a community asset is at stake.

202. See Richard A. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 BUS. L.
1433> 1433 A2003@ A5The 'uestion that naturally arises is why not get rid of this ever expanding
alphabet soup of corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs,
and replace it with a unified system" :n other words> is it not time for entity rationaliBation"-@.

